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I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of this comment will be threefold, (1) to trace the de-
velopment of the doctrine of unseaworthiness, otherwise known as the
warranty of seaworthiness, (2) to examine the reasons why it was ex-
tended to longshoremen, and (3) to question the basic rationale under-
lying that extension.
As a preview, a recent (1967) case that exemplifies the many
elements now contained in a typical action by a longshoreman for injuries
will be presented. In Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp. v. Polskie Linie
Oceaniczne,' a longshoreman,2 John Newby, was injured when he slipped
and fell while descending a ladder. His hatch-boss testified that there
was a slippery substance on his shoes similar to a syrup that had been
spilled in an earlier unloading operation conducted by the same stevedor-
ing contractor.
Newby brought an action against Polskie Linie Oceaniczne for
damages for the personal injuries sustained. Jurisdiction was based upon
diversity of citizenship and the amount involved. The complaint was
based upon unseaworthiness and negligence. The defendant-shipowner
impleaded Newby's employer, Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., seeking
complete indemnity, costs, and attorney's fees. The case was submitted
to a jury on the unseaworthiness count, and the jury returned a verdict
against the shipowner in the amount of $4,000.
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. 386 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1967).
2. "Longshoreman" usually refers to the laborer who does the actual work, whereas
a "stevedore" is the contractor or boss who employs longshoremen. DE KERCHOVE, INTER-
NATIONAL MARITIME DICTIONARY 473 (1961).
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The impleader action was not submitted to the jury. Instead the
court directed a verdict on the motion of the shipowner against Old
Dominion for indemnification, holding that if the shipowner were found
liable to the plaintiff, it followed as a matter of law on the evidence pre-
sented that Old Dominion should indemnify the shipowner. Judgment
was entered on the jury's verdict, and the court then entered judgment
for the shipowner against Old Dominion in the amount of $7,320.39-
$4,000 representing the plaintiff's verdict and $3,320.39 representing
costs and attorney's fees.
The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the verdict was grossly
inadequate. Old Dominion cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision. While the details of the reasoning will not be covered at
this point since they rest upon the historical background to be developed,
the salient elements of the case will be noted: (1) the action for unsea-
worthiness was submitted to a jury, (2) the longshoreman sued the
shipowner for unseaworthiness despite the fact that the slippery condi-
tion was apparently brought about by the stevedore's negligence, (3)
the shipowner was able to collect complete indemnification from the
stevedore for the plaintiff's verdict and also for costs and attorney's fees,
(4) the recovery by the plaintiff was relatively small.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Seamen's Recoveries for Personal Injuries
A single injury may give a seaman three causes of action against
his employer-shipowner: one for maintenance and cure, another for
damages based upon the negligence principles of the Jones Act,8 and a
third for damages based on the maritime concept of unseaworthiness.
Of the three, by far the most ancient is the action for maintenance and
cure which can be traced back to the Laws of Oleron4 which were com-
piled and promulgated by Richard the First on his return from the Holy
Land.5 This law of the sea provided for medical treatment and wages
to a mariner wounded or falling ill in the service of the ship., The Jones
Act, however, is of relatively recent vintage. As passed by Congress in
1915 and amended in 1920,1 it is based on negligence and incorporates
3. 46 U.S.C. 1 688 (1964).
4. M. MORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN 578 (1962).
5. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 7 (1957).
6. "The seaman when sick or injured in the service of the vessel without wilful mis-
behavior on his part, is entitled to the remedy of maintenance and cure, i.e., wages to the
end of the voyage and subsistence, lodging and care to the point where the maximum cure
attainable has been reached." M. MORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 26 (1959).
7. Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007, amending Act of March 4, 1915,
ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185. This allows any seaman who suffers personal injury in the course
of his employment, at his election, to maintain an action at law, with a right to trial by
jury [hereinafter referred to as the Jones Act].
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the provisions of the F.E.L.A.5 The concept of unseaworthiness was
created in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century by American ad-
miralty courts.9
B. The Development of the Unseaworthiness Doctrine for Seamen
The origin of a seaman's right to recover for injuries caused by an
unseaworthy ship is far from clear. Because of the peculiar perils and
hardships of maritime service, the courts very early recognized the sea-
man as a ward of admiralty and extended to him the protection of the
unseaworthiness doctrine. When first applied to seamen, however, the
doctrine allowed only the privilege of abandoning an unfit ship without
suffering the forfeiture of wages or the penalties for desertion. 10 Early
American maritime law limited the shipowner's obligation for personal
injuries suffered in the ship's service to "maintenance and cure.""
It is generally conceded that the birth of the unseaworthiness con-
cept stemmed from Mr. Justice Brown's much-quoted second proposition
in The Osceola: 2
That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and Amer-
ican law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen
in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure
to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant
to the ship.
It is arguable that the import of the above-quoted second proposition
in The Osceola was not to broaden the shipowner's liability, but rather to
limit liability for negligence to those situations where his negligence
resulted in the vessel's unseaworthiness. 1 The first reference by the Su-
preme Court to the shipowner's obligation to furnish a seaworthy ship
as explicitly unrelated to the standard of ordinary care in a personal
injury case appeared in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger,'4 in which
the court in a few lines innovated the rule of absolute liability:
[W] e think the trial court might have told the jury that without
regard to negligence the vessel was unseaworthy when she left
the dock ... and that if thus unseaworthy and one of the crew
received damage as the direct result thereof, he was entitled to
recover compensatory damages.
8. Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51 (1964).
9. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 544 (1960).
10. "The other route through which the concept of unseaworthiness found its way into
the maritime law was via the rules covering marine insurance and the carriage of goods by
sea." Id.
11. Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness: Developing Restriction of The Act-Condi-
tion Dichotomy, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 322 (1967).
12. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
13. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 546 (1960).
14. 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Mitchell com-
mented on the above statement:"5
No explication accompanied this dogmatic pronouncement....
It was strangely deemed sufficient to rely on the unelaborated
citation of two cases in this Court . . . which were concerned
not with the rights of seamen but with the shipowner's liability
for cargo damage .... Neither our own investigation nor that
of the parties here has disclosed a single case in an English or
in an American court prior to Sandanger in which the absolute
duty to provide a seaworthy vessel for cargo carriage and ma-
rine insurance contracts was applied to a seaman's suit for per-
sonal injury. Sandanger was an unilluminated departure in the
law of the sea.
In 1944 came the landmark decision of Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co."6 Chief Justice Stone's opinion in that case gave an unqualified stamp
of solid authority to the view that The Osceola was correctly to be
understood as holding that the duty to provide a seaworthy ship does
not depend at all upon the negligence of the shipowner or his agents. In
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,17 the Supreme Court made quite clear
the fact that the doctrine of unseaworthiness is a doctrine of strict
liability.
C. Longshoremen Become "Seamen"
In the early part of the Twentieth Century workmen's compensa-
tion acts were passed to provide relief for injuries to employees. The
employer is charged with the injuries without regard to any question of
the employee's negligence. It is a form of strict liability. Therefore, the
common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk
and the fellow servant rule are abolished. When an injury to an employee
is found to be covered by a workmen's compensation act, it is uniformly
held that the statutory compensation is the sole remedy, and any recovery
at common law is barred."8
Since longshoremen work at a particularly hazardous trade 9 it
would be thought that the state workmen's compensation acts as they
were enacted would have covered longshoremen. New York's act did.
However, the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen" held
that the New York act was unconstitutional as it applied to longshore-
15. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 552-53 (1960).
16. 321 U.S. 96, 101 (1944).
17. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
18. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 555 (3d ed. 1964).
19. "Longshoremen have one of the highest accident-frequency rates in American
industry. The rates for longshoremen in the Port of New York are higher than the rates
of every other industry with the possible exception of logging." Comment, Risk Distribu-
tion and Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174, 1186 (1966).
20. 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
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men. Mr. Justice McReynolds wrote the majority opinion, in which he
stated that the work of longshoremen was maritime in nature and that
Congress had the paramount power to fix and determine the maritime
law that prevailed throughout the country. It was difficult, if not im-
possible, to define with exactness the degree to which the general mari-
time law might be changed by state legislation. To permit the several
states to apply their varying compensation laws would be to destroy the
very uniformity in maritime matters that the Constitution was designed
to establish. It was a five-to-four decision with Mr. Justice Holmes
writing one of the dissenting opinions. The majority had admitted the
applicability of state wrongful death statutes to maritime cases. Holmes
said, "[I] can see no difference between [a liability] otherwise constitu-
tionally created for death caused by accident and one for death due to
fault."'21
Congress amended the "saving-to-suitors clause"'22 to give claimants
the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any
state. Mr. Justice McReynolds was not appeased. In Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart,2" he said that the "saving-to-suitors" clause conferred no
substantive rights and did not authorize the states to do so. It referred
only to remedies. Again the decision was five-to-four, with Justices
Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis and Clarke dissenting.
Congress tried once more. Rather obviously, it did not want to go
into the workmen's compensation business for itself. The plan this time
was to except from the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
workmen's compensation remedies only for persons other than the
master or members of the crew of a vessel.24 The theory was that the
idea of uniformity applied to shipboard employees and might be relaxed
with respect to those who lived ashore and did not habitually move from
state to state. Mr. Justice McReynolds, however, was guarding the
bridge like Horatius. In State of Washington v. W.C. Dawson Co.,25 he
said: "The exception of master and crew is wholly insufficient to meet
the objections to such enactments heretofore often pointed out." This
decision is difficult to reconcile with a decision2" two years earlier in
which the Court had upheld the application of state workmen's com-
pensation laws to a ship construction worker injured on navigable waters.
The rationale applied to longshoremen did not apply to ship repairmen.
Longshoremen and other maritime harbor workers injured on navigable
waters had to be content with their common law remedies. Mr. Justice
McReynolds, however, in Dawson strongly hinted that Congress had the
21. Id. at 219.
22. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395.
23. 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920).
24. Act of June 1, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634.
25. 264 U.S. 219, 223 (1924).
26. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
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power to enact a type of workmen's compensation act for longshoremen.
He stoutly denied, however, that it could be delegated to the states.
To retrace, in 1914 the Supreme Court held that maritime injuries
to longshoremen were within the admiralty jurisdiction because the service
was maritime." In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty 8 the Court
applied the above holding and determined that a longshoreman was a
seaman ! Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the opinion:
It is true that for most purposes, as the word is commonly used,
stevedores [longshoremen] are not "seamen." But the words
are flexible. The work upon which the plaintiff was engaged was
a maritime service formerly rendered by the ship's crew ...
[W] e are of opinion that a wider scope should be given to the
words of the [Jones] act, and that in this statute "seamen" is
to be taken to include stevedores [longshoremen] employed in
maritime work on navigable waters as the plaintiff was ....
Mr. Justice Holmes did not elaborate on the above statement, which
turned out to have far-reaching repercussions, but rather he seemed
intent upon having the longshoremen classified as seamen in order that
they might receive the benefits of the Jones Act. If Holmes had known
at the time what was to follow he might have checked more thoroughly
into his statement that longshoremen's "work was a maritime service
formerly rendered by the ship's crew."
It turned out to be unnecessary to find that longshoremen were sea-
men in order for them to receive statutory benefits for injuries, because
the following year Congress followed Mr. Justice McReynolds' hint and
enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.29
This act provided for payment to longshoremen and harbor workers
benefits similar to those under the state workmen's compensation acts,
but generally the benefits were higher than those under the state acts,
and, of course, they were uniform throughout the United States. It pro-
vided for recovery only when workmen's compensation benefits may not
be validly provided by state law. The liability of the employer is exclusive
and in place of all other liability of the employer to his employee.
D. The Unseaworthiness Doctrine Extended to Longshoremen
The climactic case of this comment is unquestionably Seas Shipping
Co., Inc. v. Sieracki.30 In Sieracki a shipowner had entered into a contract
with Sieracki's employer, an independant contracting stevedore. Sieracki
was engaged in the loading of a piece of large equipment into the ship's
27. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
28. 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926).
29. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1960) (herein-
after referred to as the Compensation Act].
30. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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hold. He was injured when a shackle supporting part of the ship's loading
gear broke because of a flaw in its manufacture. The shipowner and the
shipbuilder were co-defendants in the original litigation. The trial court
held the shipbuilder liable for negligence in installing the defective
shackle, but the shipowner was held not liable since a reasonable exam-
ination would not have discovered the defect. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that the shipowner was liable even though he had not been
negligent." The Supreme Court affirmed, stating:
The principal question is whether the obligation of seaworthi-
ness, traditionally owed by an owner of a ship to seamen, ex-
tends to a stevedore injured while working aboard the ship.2
That an owner is liable to indemnify a seaman for an injury
caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel or its appurtenant
appliances and equipment has been settled law in this country
ever since The Osceola. . . .And the liability applies as well
when the ship is moored at a dock as when it is at sea. 3
Historically the work of loading and unloading is the work of
the ship's service, performed until recent times by members
of the crew .... That the owner seeks to have it done with the
advantages of more modern divisions of labor does not minimize
the worker's hazard and should not nullify his protection. 4
An analysis of Sieracki will be held until after the presentation of
the historical background.
E. Shipowner Entitled to Indemnity from the Stevedore
The next important link in what has been described as "wasteful
litigation"38 occurred in Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Corp." In Ryan the stevedore contractor handled both the
loading and unloading of the ship under contract for Pan-Atlantic but
with no express indemnity agreement. Because of apparent negligence
by the stevedore in loading, a longshoreman, employed by this stevedore,
was injured while unloading when a heavy roll broke loose. The long-
shoreman received compensation of $2,940 and medical costs of $9,857.36
under the Longshoreman Act. Nevertheless, he sued the shipowner claim-
ing, inter alia, unseaworthiness. The shipowner filed a third party com-
plaint against the stevedore. The jury returned a verdict of $75,000
from which sum the insurance carrier was to be reimbursed for the
$12,797.36 it had advanced to the longshoreman. Judgment was entered
on the verdict, but the third party complaint was dismissed. The Court
31. 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945).
32. Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 87 (1946).
33. Id. at 90.
34. Id. at 96.
35. Comment, Risk Distribution and Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174, 1190 (1966).
36. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the longshoreman but reversed the
dismissal of the third party complaint and directed that judgment be
entered for the shipowner. 7 The Supreme Court affirmed, and held that
the shipowner's action for indemnity was not barred by the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. It then raised the ques-
tion of whether the shipowner was entitled to indemnity in the absence
of an express agreement. The court said the essence of stevedoring con-
tract is a warranty of workmanlike service, comparable to a manufac-
turer's warranty; competency and safety of stowage are inescapable
elements of the service undertaken. It was a five-to-four decision with
Mr. Justice Black writing the dissent: "I think the Court's holding today
breaks promises the [Compensation] Act made both to employers and
employees. '38 Black went on to say the Act had told employers that it
was to be exclusive in place of all other liability to the employee. The
employer had paid his premiums on his compensation policy, yet the
Court allowed the employee to sue the shipowner who in turn was allowed
indemnity from the employer. The result was that the employer who had
been told that the recovery under the Act was exclusive was required to
pay a $75,000 verdict.
Later cases extended both the scope of the application of the un-
seaworthiness doctrine and the stevedore's implied warranty of workman-
like service. In Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 9 a longshoreman
slipped on some loose beans spilled on the dock from defective bags dur-
ing the unloading of cargo. The Court reiterated Sieracki's position that:
"Seaworthiness is not limited . . .to fitness for travel on the high seas;
it includes fitness for loading and unloading"4 and found that the doc-
trine of seaworthiness "applies to longshoremen unloading the ship
whether they are standing aboard ship or on the pier."'" In Italia Societa
Per Azioni Di. Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc.' it was held
that a stevedore's implied warranty of workmanlike service was breached
even though, the stevedore non-negligently supplied the defective equip-
ment which injured one of its employees.
III. THE UNSEAWORTHINESS DOCTRINE TODAY
A. Longshoremen May Demand Trial By Jury
Admiralty claims traditionally are not tried before a jury.4 3 The
proceedings may be either in personam against the employer-shipowner,
37. Palazzolo v. Pan-American S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954).
38. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 135 (1956).
39. 373 U.S. 206 (1963)
40. Id. at 213.
41. Id. at 215.
42. 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e): "These rules shall not be construed to create a right to trial
by jury of the issues in an admiralty . . . claim . . ." There is no constitutional barrier to
jury trials in admiralty, and Congress could, if it so wished, provide for jury trials. In
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in rem against the vessel, or both." Under the "saving to suitors" clause45
the action may be brought in a state court, and if diversity of citizenship
exists the action may also be taken on the "law side" of the federal
court.46 If a seaman were injured on the high seas because of unsea-
worthiness, his exclusive remedy would be in admiralty as he would not
fall within the scope of the "saving to suitors" clause.47
A longshoreman, on the other hand, bringing suit in a federal court,
by showing diversity of citizenship, may elect to bring his action on the
"law side" and thereby demand trial by jury provided that the suit is
in personam.41 Since a suit for personal injuries caused by unseaworthi-
ness will frequently be for damages in excess of $10,000, if diversity of
citizenship is present, a longshoreman will bring his suit in the federal
court on the "law side" in order to have the benefit of trial by jury49 as
shown in the introductory case, Old Dominion.
fact, it did so provide by the Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726-27. The constitu-
tionality of this statutory trial by jury provision was upheld in The Propeller Genesse
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 Howard) 443, 459 (1851): "In admiralty and maritime
cases there is no ... limitation as to the mode of proceeding, and Congress may therefore
in cases of that description, give either party right of trial by jury .... Y
44. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
45. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, while granting original jurisdiction of civil
causes in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal district courts, expressly saved
to suitors the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it.
The section was rewritten in the Judiciary Code of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964) and the
"saving" clause now reads, "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled."
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 states: "These rules govern the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity
or in admiralty . . . " FED. R. Cirv. P. 2 provides that there shall be one form of action to
be known as a "civil action." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) provides: "If the claim is cognizable
only in admiralty it is an admiralty . .. claim . .. " Added Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 4, 1966.
Although we recognize that there is now one form of action, to distinguish claims cognizable
at law from the claims cognizable in admiralty we shall refer to the "law side" of the
federal court when referring to claims cognizable at law.
47. Cf. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963). If a Jones Act claim
is joined with claims for unseaworthiness and for maintenance and cure, there is a right
to trial by jury on all of the claims even if the Jones Act claim is resolved against the
seaman.
48. See, e.g., Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355,
359-60 (1962) involving a suit by a long-shoreman for unseaworthiness. The Supreme
Court stated:
Therefore, a suit for breach of a maritime contract, while it may be brought in
admiralty, may also be pursued in an ordinary civil action, since ... it is a suit
in personam....
This suit being in the federal courts by reason of diversity of citizenship carried
with it ... the right to trial by jury.
See also Carter v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 166 F. Supp. 307, 311 (D.Md. 1958). Trial by
jury was demanded, the amount in controversy was in excess of $10,000, but there existed no
diversity of citizenship. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a trial by jury
and amended the complaint from a "civil complaint" to one "in admiralty." The court
stated: "I know of no case ... where the plaintiff has been entitled to demand a jury trial
in a case of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, where there is no diversity of citizenship."
49. Recently The American Law Institute issued its Tentative Draft No. 6, dated
April 30, 1968. This contains proposed changes of the division of jurisdiction between state
and federal courts, including admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The famous "saving
1968)
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B. Indemnity to the Shipowner from the Stevedore
The stevedore's implied warranty of workmanlike service initiated
in Ryan now may be considered an integral part of the unseaworthiness
doctrine. The shipowner's right to indemnity has been held to mean
complete indemnity, including the cost of attorneys' fees and other costs,
to the shipowner when he seeks indemnity from the stevedore for the
amount awarded the longeshoreman.'O Thus, as in Old Dominion, although
the longshoreman recovered $4,000, the stevedore had to pay $7,320.39
because of the addition of costs and attorney's fees.
C. Doctrine of Operational Negligence Rejected
Although the doctrine of unseaworthiness is a theory of strict liabil-
ity, the Courts of Appeals of the various circuits developed an exception
known as the doctrine of operational negligence. A case frequently cited
when the doctrine was applied was Grillea v. United States5 in which
the court held that a ship is not rendered unseaworthy by a negligent act
that causes an accident during the progress of work on board so long
as the act could be considered as an incident in a continuous course of
operation. This doctrine of operational negligence was rejected in 1967
by the Supreme Court in Mascuilli v. United States. 2
IV. THE RATIONALE OF Sieracki EXAMINED
A. The Characterization of Longshoremen as Seamen
In Sieracki, the Court said: "Historically the work of loading and
unloading is the work of the ship's service, performed until recent times
by members of the crew,"5 and it then placed great emphasis on Hav-
erty.54 In fairness to Justice Holmes in Haverty, his characterization of
longshoremen as seamen was motivated by the apparent desire to secure
for them the benefits of the Jones Act. However, it was an unnecessary
step since the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
denied the longshoremen the benefits of the Jones Act and at the same
to suitors" clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 would be replaced by § 1316(b) which would give
the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction in actions for limitation of liability and maritime
actions in rem. The federal courts would have concurrent jursdiction with state courts in
all other actions which would include personal injury and wrongful death at sea.
The proposed § 1319 expands the right to trial by jury to admiralty actions. The section
provides: (1) for jury trial if diversity or a federal question provide an independent basis
of federal jurisdiction and a right to jury trial would otherwise exist; (2) for jury trial on
demand for all claims within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in a federal court-
other than those heard in a limitation of liabilty-if the relief sought is limited to money
damages for personal injury or death; (3) that in all other actions within the jurisdiction no
right to jury trial exists.
50. DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962).
51. 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
52. 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
53. Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 96 (1946).
54. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
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time provided compensation similar to workmen's compensation without
any need for their being classified as "seamen." In Sieracki the Court
cited Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek 55 for the proposition that an
injury to a stevedore is a maritime tort. The Court cited Florez v. The
Scotia,56 The Gilbert Knapp,5 7 The Segurancal8 and its own prior holding
in Haverty as support for its statement that the work of loading and
unloading was historically performed by members of the crew. These
cases deal only with the question of whether a stevedore is entitled to a
maritime lien. To grant such a lien, a court need find only that the
stevedore's services were maritime in nature. This conclusion can be
reached without holding that the cargo-handling operations were form-
erly conducted by the crew. More importantly, historical research has
shown the work of loading and unloading was generally not handled by
members of the crew.
Authorities tracing the historical background have reached con-
clusions contrary to the statement in Sieracki. In a book published in
1965 by Nicholas J. Healy and Brainerd Currie, 9 citing first the Laws
of Oleron, the authors conclude that it was an ancient maritime custom
to employ certain officers, (called Sacquiers and Arrameurs) of ports
for the loading and unloading of vessels. Under the Theodosian Code
these sacquiers were even found as far back as ancient Rome.
The conclusion of Healy was backed up by Leighton Shields, Jr.
and Thomas E. Byrne, Jr., in a well-documented article."0 Shields and
Byrne found that in 1799 in the port of Philadelphia it was the general
custom to hire workers other than the mariners to load and unload
the vessels. The reason was that the merchants found it in their interest
to do so as the mariners were apt to be ungovernable after a voyage was
ended. Shields and Byrne found in Peters' Admiralty Decisions,"' a
collection of early American maritime cases, that under ancient maritime
codes it was clearly indicated that sailors did not load or unload cargo.
Similarly, stevedores were employed in New England in 1790 to replace
the unruly mariners.62 Stevedores, referred to as "porters" were long
used in the Port of London and by the middle of the Eighteenth Century
developed such a strong union that: "No labour in the port could be
performed by any other person whilst there was a sufficient number of
these men offering themselves."6" However, the use of longshoremen in
55. 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
56. 35 F. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1888).
57. 37 F. 209 (E.D. Wis. 1889).
58. 58 F. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
59. N. HEvAEy & B. CuRtou, ADmIATY 339-40 (1965) [Hereinafter referred to as
Healey].
60. Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine To Longshoremen,
II U. PA. L. Rav. 1137 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Shields & Byrne].
61. Id. at 1140.
62. Id. at 1141.
63. Id. at 1143.
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London can be traced as far back as 1282.64 Shields and Byrne found,
as did Healy, that in ancient Rome and also in Greece a clear distinction
was made between "the men who sailed the ships" and those who per-
formed what would today be longshoremen's work."
This is not to imply that cases cannot be found in which seamen
unloaded the ship. However, the Supreme Court in Sieracki did not state
the work was sometimes performed by members of the crew. They said
explicitly that until recent times the work of loading and unloading was
done by members of the crew, and because of this historical "fact" the
longshoreman is a seaman because he is doing a seaman's work. The
writer is merely pointing out the contrary to be true; in other words,
historically there has long been a division of labor, and it is a grave
error to base such an important holding as Sieracki on a dogmatic state-
ment that was not historically documented. Mr. Justice Holmes' char-
acterization of longshoremen as seamen in Haverty is understandable as
he was trying to secure for the longshoremen the benefits of the Jones
Act. He made no attempt to justify the characterization historically. The
characterization of longshoreman in Sieracki is not understandable as
it has no sound historical basis.
B. Wasteful Litigation Caused by the Sieracki Doctrine66
Shields and Byrne estimated that 40 percent of the total cost of
the Sieracki doctrine is for lawyers' fees.67 In fact, cases may be found
in which the court held that a "fair and reasonable compensation" for
the plaintiff's attorney "is fixed at one-half of the recovery."6 Benefits
under the Compensation Act may be paid over a period of years depend-
ing upon the nature of the injury, whereas the recovery in a suit for
unseaworthiness is paid in a lump sum.69 For example, in the introductory
case of Old Dominion the plaintiff received an award of $4,000 which
cost his employer $7,320.39 because of the application of the Ryan
indemnification principle that included the shipowner's cost and attorney's
fees of $3,320.39. However, the plaintiff had to pay his attorney out of
his $4,000. If calculated at the 40 per cent rate, the plaintiff's attorney
would receive $1,600, and the plaintiff $3,400. Therefore, in that case in
order to give the plaintiff $3,400, his employer was forced to pay a judg-
ment of $7,320.29. The jury verdict of $4,000 was not typical; for exam-
ple, in Ryan the jury verdict was for $75,000 which would naturally
64. Id. at 1145.
65. Id. at 1146.
66. Hereinafter, reference to the Sieracki doctrine will include the extension of the un-
seaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen by Sieracki and the shipowner's subsequent right to
indemnification from the stevedoring contractor because of the contractor's implied warranty
of workmanlike service created by Ryan.
67. Shields & Byrne at 1150.
68. See, e.g., Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805, 809 (E.D. Va. 1960).
69. Shields & Byrne supra note 60, at 1148.
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produce a much larger burden on the employer with the addition of costs
and attorney's fees. However, in the Old Dominion case, since the award
was undoubtedly less than what the plaintiff would receive under the Com-
pensation Act, the plaintiff would still receive the amount to which he
would otherwise have been entitled without litigation. The Compensation
Act provides that if the net recovery against the third party is less than
it would have been under compensation, compensation makes up the dif-
ference." If the recovery is more than what has been paid under the
Compensation Act, the insurance company is reimbursed from the jury
verdict for the amount it may have advanced, as in Ryan. Because of the
cumulative effect of benefits payable over a period of years as contrasted
with a lump sum payment, Shields and Byrne show a case 71 where an
award of $80,000 was actually less than the total benefits payable over a
period of years, under compensation, viz., $94,110.84 .7 The $80,000
award, however, was reduced by costs and attorney's fees to the plaintiff
by $27,649.17 leaving a net recovery to the plaintiff of $52,349.83. This
still does not include the costs and attorney's fees paid by the employer
to the shipowner under the indemnification principle! It is not surprising
that the Sieracki doctrine has been termed wasteful litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The writer feels that it was a grievous error to extend the unsea-
worthiness doctrine to longshoremen for the following reasons, as ex-
plained above: (1) the statement in Sieracki that longshoremen are
performing what is traditionally seamen's work is historically inaccurate;
(2) longshoremen are not members of a class that the unseaworthy
doctrine was originally designed to protect; (3) a seaman injured at sea
as the result of an unseaworthy condition must litigate in admiralty with-
out a jury; whereas a longshoreman, if he meets the federal jurisdictional
requirements, may sue on the "law side" with the benefits of a trial by
jury; 73 (4) the longshoremen have the guaranteed protection of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, but their employers are being
subjected to wasteful litigation and double liability under the Ryan
decision.
The Sieracki doctrine has been upheld by many subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, and it could be argued that it is hopeless to expect the
Supreme Court to overturn this doctrine now. Perhaps this is true but
not necessarily hopeless. The Supreme Court has been known to overturn
long established doctrines; one of the more famous examples would be
70. 33 U.S.C. § 933(g) (1964).
71. Shields & Byrne supra note 60, at 1148.
72. Id. at 1148.
73. Cf. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
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found in the doctrine established in 1842 by Swift v. Tyson.74 This well-
ingrained doctrine was overturned ninety-six years later in 1938 by
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.75 Two factors were involved in the Erie
decision: (1) recognition that the construction originally given by the
Court was erroneous as shown by "research of a competent scholar,' 17
and (2) recognition that the "[c]riticism of the doctrine [had become]
widespread. '77
These same two factors may now be found in relation to the
Sieracki doctrine. First, as already pointed out, authorities have examined
the statement that historically loading and unloading were performed by
members of the crew, and they have found that the statement cannot be
supported by history.
As to the second point, criticism of Sieracki is likewise widespread.
In a 1967 article in the Oregon Law Review it was stated:
[P] rior to the Jones Act, a recovery for unseaworthiness might
have been justified.... With the advent of the Jones Act in 1920
this argument lost efficacy. The law has seen set to limit re-
coveries for unseaworthiness which injure shippers of cargo; it
seems incongruous that there should be, at the same time, an
extension of liability where the unseaworthy condition causes
personal injury.78
In the Yale Law Journal it was stated:
The root cause of current controversy is the leading case of
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki. . . .7 Congress must end the
wasteful litigation which occurs when the maritime worker sues
the shipper who, in turn, seeks indemnification from the em-
ployer.8 0
In 1966 Judge Friendly raised his voice in a dissenting opinion:
It is time to scuttle a doctrine which requires judges to make
distasteful hair-splitting distinctions unrelated to any intelligible
concepts of right or wrong .... 81
There is no question that the Sieracki doctrine has resulted in
wasteful litigation. The problem is, however, whether the Supreme Court
74. 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842).
75. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
76. Id. at 72.
77. Id. at 73.
78. Foley, A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 OaE. L. REV. 369,
399 (1967).
79. Comment, Risk Distribution and Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174 (1966).
80. Id. at 1190. See also Saari, Crew Conduct as Unseaworthiness, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 265, 275 (1966), wherein it is stated: "It seems repugnant to all law that a shipowner
should be liable under the doctrine of unseaworthiness for occurrences which he has no
reasonable way of preventing."
81. Skibinski v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 360 F.2d 539, 544 (2d Cir. 1966).
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will recognize its error as it did in Erie and disapprove the Sieracki
doctrine. If not, the answer lies with Congress. If it feels that the benefits
of the Compensation Act are inadequate, they could expand the benefits
with the stipulation that it is the exclusive remedy specifically excluding
any further recovery for unseaworthiness. Certainly a somewhat higher
premium for their compensation policies would be much cheaper in the
long run for the stevedoring contractors than the expenses which will
result from the application of the Sieracki doctrine.
